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ABSTRACT 
This thesis will argue that the most effective strategy for eradicating the 
U.S. designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), is 
to bolster the current peace talks between the Republic of the Philippines and the 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).  The MILF has been providing support and 
sanctuary to the ASG which has hindered U.S.-Philippine counter-terror 
operations.  This thesis will explain why a shift in U.S.-Philippine strategy is 
required by examining what historical circumstances led to the creation of the 
ASG; the supporting-supported relationship between the MILF and ASG; and 
lastly, the effectiveness of the U.S.-Philippine response to the ASG from 2001-
2007.  
If the peace talks between the Government of the Philippines (GRP) and 
the MILF succeed, they will lead not only to a loss of critical MILF support to the 
ASG, but will also allow the AFP to hunt down and eradicate the remaining ASG 
in areas that had previously been untenable.  Successful execution of this 
strategy will bolster regional stability in Southeast Asia by defeating one of the 
targets of the Global War on Terror as well as diminishing one of the places of 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
This thesis will argue that the most effective strategy for eradicating the 
U.S. designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), is 
to bolster the current peace talks between the Republic of the Philippines and the 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).  The MILF has been providing support and 
sanctuary to the ASG which has hindered U.S.-Philippine counter-terror 
operations.1  This thesis will explain why a shift in U.S.-Philippine strategy is 
required by exploring the following:  
1.  How the rise of Muslim secessionist groups in the Southern Philippines 
eventually led to the creation of the Abu Sayyaf Group.  
2. The supporting/supported relationship between the MILF and ASG.  
3. The U.S.-Philippine response to the Abu Sayyaf Group following the 
events of September 11, 2001. 
In order to best deal with the remaining Abu Sayyaf threat, the U.S. must 
continue to assist in the Malaysian-sponsored peace talks between the 
Government of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF.  A lasting peace will not only 
result in a loss of critical MILF support to the ASG, but will also allow the AFP to 
hunt down and eradicate the remaining ASG in areas that had previously been 
untenable.  Successful execution of this strategy will bolster regional stability in 
Southeast Asia by defeating one of the targets of the Global War on Terror as 
well as diminishing one of the places of refuge of international terrorists.   
A. BACKGROUND 
The Republic of the Philippines has been battling insurgent groups of 
differing ideologies for over four decades.  In fact, the Muslim insurgency in the 
Southern Philippines has been particularly challenging to the young Republic.  
Despite early attempts at resolution by the Philippine government, the Muslim 
separatist movement has continued to grow in strength over time, splitting into 
three major factions.    
                                            
1 Zachary Abuza, “Balik-Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf,” Strategic Studies 
Institute. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB625.pdf.  Accessed 10 Mar 
2007, 12. 
2 
Figure 1.   Map of the Republic of the Philippines.2 
 
                                            
2 CIA World Factbook. http:www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/rp.html. Accessed 9 
Feb 2007. 
3 
The first major group to be established was the Moro National Liberation Front 
(MNLF) in the early 1970s.  The second group to form was the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF) in 1984.  Last, and perhaps the most violent Muslim 
separatist group operating in the region, is the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), or 
“Bearer of the Sword”.  This group split from the much larger MNLF in the early 
1990s with the main purpose of establishing an independent Islamic state, based 
on Sharia law.  
The ASG rejected the non-violent practices adopted by the MNLF as the 
ASG prefers violent struggle, or “Jihad”, as its ideological strategy.  The ASG 
successfully competed with the MNLF for the leadership of the Moros’ national 
struggle, successfully taking advantage of a pre-existing Islamic trend within the 
MNLF.   During the 1970’s and 1980’s the Moros nationalist mainstream political 
force did nothing to inhibit the Islamists’ increased participation in the armed 
struggle against the Philippine government as they acknowledged the radicals’ 
contributions to the overall effort to drive the government to make political and 
territorial concessions.  This was exacerbated by the return of radical Filipinos 
who had fought with the mujahideen against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in 
the early 1980s.  In 1991 the ASG split away from the MNLF as they were bitterly 
opposed to the concessions that were being introduced in the peace process 
between Manila and the MNLF.3  The ASG wanted complete independence, not 
autonomy.4  Although claiming to be a legitimate secessionist organization, the 
ASG’s continued use of crime and terror discredited the group and earned them 
a place on the United States’ list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on October 8, 
1997- a designation not shared by the other Muslim separatist groups in the 
region.   
                                            
3 Simon Elegant, “The Return of Abu Sayyaf,” Time Magazine. August 2004. 
http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/article/0,13673,501040830-686107,00.html. Accessed 
10 Mar 2007. 
4 Octavio A. Dinampotavio, “A Last Extended Interview with Janajalani,” Inquirer Headlines, 
January 22, 2007. 
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view_article.php?article_id44761. Accessed 
31 Mar 2007. 
4 
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Republic of the 
Philippines was quick to offer the use of former U.S. bases, Subic Bay Naval 
Base and Clark Air Base, to the U.S. led coalition against international terrorism.5  
In response to the Philippine declaration of support to the Global War on Terror 
(GWOT), the United States committed almost 1,300 troops and $93 million in 
military aid to assist the Philippine government’s fight against the ASG on Basilan 
Island.  Over a six-month period Philippine forces, with U.S. assistance, were 
able to rout the ASG’s stranglehold on Basilan- forcing the remaining ASG to flee 
to relative sanctuary in areas controlled by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF) in Mindanao and Jolo.  Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) 
commanders attributed their successes to U.S. equipment, U.S. intelligence 
gathering, and U.S. assistance in planning AFP operations.6    
Despite the attrition of roughly half of their forces by the joint U.S.-
Philippine military and political actions after 9/11, the threat from the Abu Sayyaf 
Group has not dissipated.7  Following their displacement from Basilan to 
Mindanao and Jolo, the ASG regrouped and resumed sporadic but significant 
domestic terrorist operations.  In fact, since the conclusion of U.S.-Philippine 
bilateral operations in July of 2002, the ASG’s tactics appear to have shifted from 
kidnap-for-ransom operations to bombings.  This apparently dictates that the 
group has returned to its earlier radical, more politicized agenda in order to 
expand its capabilities and area of operations.  The ASG motivation for 
operational change is apparently due to the resumption of peace talks between 
the Philippine government and the MILF, which are slowly defusing the primary 
secessionist movement in the southern Philippines.  Ultimately, the ASG believes 
                                            
5 Renato Cruz De Castro, “Addressing International Terrorism in Southeast Asia: A Matter of 
Strategic or Functional Approach?” Contemporary Southeast Asia (August 2004): 1. 
6 Larry Nicksh, “Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation,” 
Congressional Research Service (January 20, 2006): 2. 
7 Insurgent numbers were estimated in mid-2001 to be between 800 and 850.  By mid-2006 
AFP reports estimate 400 ASG remain.  
5 
that strict adherence to a radical Islamist ideology is paramount to their group 
becoming a viable separatist force in the Philippines.8   
There are several examples of this operational shift:  first, following the 
2002 U.S.-Philippine bilateral exercise Balikatan, the ASG had a role in a 
roadside bombing outside a Philippine military base in Zamboanga that killed a 
U.S. Special Forces serviceman.  Second, the leader of the ASG, Khaddafy 
Janjalani, taking advantage of the protections and support offered to the ASG by 
certain radical MILF commanders, established links with Jeemah Islamiyah (JI)9 
in March 2003 and requested that they train ASG and MILF members in bomb 
assembly and detonation.10   Following this training ASG, JI, and MILF cadre 
then carried out bombings in Davao, Mindanao, which killed 38.11  Third, 
Janjalani also established links with the Rajah Solaiman Movement, a radical 
Muslim group made up of Filipinos from the northern Philippines who had 
converted to Islam.12  Together, these two groups carried out major bombings 
after 2003, including bombings in metropolitan Manila as well as the SuperFerry 
14 bombing in Manila Bay, which killed approximately 194.  Lastly, and of  
 
 
                                            
8 In a recently released interview, the late Khadaffi Janjalani recognized that there had been 
a shift from kidnap operations to bombings.  He would not admit to the reason, stating it was a 
military secret.  Dr. Zachary Abuza, in Balik-terror, attributes the shift as a means to re-energize 
the Islamic separatist movement in the Southern Philippines. 
9 Jemaah Islamiyah is a Southeast Asian–based terrorist network with links to al-Qaida. The 
network recruited and trained extremists in the late 1990s, following the stated goal of creating an 
Islamic state comprising Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the southern Philippines, and 
southern Thailand.  It was responsible for the bombing of the J. W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta on 5 
August 2003, the Bali bombings on 12 October 2002, and an attack against the Philippine 
Ambassador to Indonesia in August 2000. The Bali plot, which left more than 200 dead, was 
reportedly the final outcome of meetings in early 2002 in Thailand, where attacks against 
Singapore and soft targets such as tourist spots in the region were also considered.  In December 
2001, Singapore authorities uncovered a JI plot to attack the U.S. and Israeli Embassies and 
British and Australian diplomatic buildings in Singapore, and in June 2003, Thai authorities 
disrupted a JI plan to attack several Western embassies and tourist sites there. Investigations 
also linked JI to bombings in December 2000 where dozens of bombs were detonated in 
Indonesia and the Philippines, killing 22 in the Philippines and 15 in Indonesia. 
10 Niksch, 5. 
11 United States Embassy to the Philippines website. 
http://usembassy.state.gov/manila/wwwhrep4.html. Accessed 10 Mar 2007. 
12 Niksch, 15. 
6 
particular importance to the United States, in March 2004 Philippine authorities 
arrested an ASG cell whose bombing targets included the U.S. Embassy in 
Manila.13   
Due to the remaining ASG threat, all bilateral exercises between the 
United States and the Philippines since 2002 have been focused on increasing 
AFP counter-terrorism capabilities.14  This thesis will argue that this strategy, 
although still necessary, is not the most effective way of eradicating the 
remaining Abu Sayyaf threat.  Instead, this thesis will argue instead for a three-
pronged approach.  First, that the United States should focus more on aiding the 
Philippine-MILF peace process that is currently being brokered by Malaysia.  If 
the current cease fire holds, and a lasting peace can be maintained, it is 
plausible that the MILF support to the ASG will decrease considerably.  A lasting 
peace agreement will also enable the AFP- whose counter-terror capabilities 
have been increased via U.S. assistance- to pursue the ASG in MILF controlled 
areas that had previously been both politically and operationally untenable.  
Second, the United States should continue to urge the Philippine government to 
institute economic reforms in crisis-ridden Mindanao.  Lastly, the United States 
should provide the assistance necessary to track down and prosecute all cases 
of systemic Philippine governmental and military corruption which have facilitated 
ASG operations.  The successful application of this three-pronged approach will 
ultimately lead to increased regional stability in Southeast Asia by defeating one 
of the targets of the Global War on Terror.   
B. DEFINING TERROR 
There are two bodies of literature that contribute to the argument.  First is 
the discussion of terror and how states should best develop effective counter-
terror programs.  Second are those works which specifically address the root 
causes of terror in the Southern Philippines, as well as how those groups that 
operate in the region share resources.   
                                            
13 United States Department of State. 2004. Country Reports on Terrorism. 
http://library.nps.navy.mil/home/tgp/tgp2.htm, 94. Accessed 10 Mar 2007.  
14 Niksch, 10-11. 
7 
There are many definitional and conceptual disagreements over the 
concept of “terror,” and as such there is no universal accepted definition.  Two 
common factors come out of this discussion: the lack of agreement over what 
constitutes terrorist activities and related phenomena such as guerrilla or violent 
protest movements; and the difficulty of making a distinction between activities 
related to “legitimate” acts of national self-determination struggles and “illegal” 
acts of violence against governments. The phrase “One man’s terrorist is 
another’s freedom fighter” is commonly used to point out this disparity.   
Modern terrorism has been in a constant state of transition since its 
inception. It has gone from the semi-legitimate use of force in the late 1800s to 
the indiscriminate violence that is broadcast daily by the media.  It is difficult to 
provide one universal label for terror due to the diverse methods and agendas 
utilized by terrorist organizations.  Martha Crenshaw proposes a definition of 
terror which appears to be best: the systematic inducement of fear and anxiety to 
control and direct a civilian population, and the phenomenon of terrorism as a 
challenge to the authority of the state.15  The Abu Sayyaf Group, with its 
campaign of bombings and kidnappings, falls squarely within this definition.   
In order to explain the causes of terrorism, Crenshaw introduces the 
concept of preconditions (enabling or permissive factors) versus precipitants 
(direct causes).16  “Preconditions” to terror include modernization, urbanization, 
social facilitation, transnational attitudes and beliefs, and the inability or 
unwillingness of a government to prevent terrorism.  All of these factors are 
easily identified after review of the situation in the Southern Philippines: massive 
migration of Christians to the area; displacement of the Moros; and a weak or 
corrupt government unable to control the situation.17  Direct causes, or 
                                            
15 Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational 
Approaches,” in Inside Terrorist Organizations, ed. David Rapoport (New York: Columbia 
University Press,1988): 482. 
16 Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism” 483. 
17 Following World War II, the GRP began state sponsorship of large-scale Christian 
migration to the Muslim South.  This migration marked the beginning of years of economic 
neglect and political discrimination, which in turn led to the creation of a Muslim nationalist 
separatist movement in the 1960’s. This will be explored in greater detail in Chapter II. 
8 
“precipitants,” of terror include the existence of concrete grievances among an 
identifiable subgroup of the population; the lack of opportunity for political 
representation; and lastly some sort of event that immediately precedes the 
outbreak of terrorism.  Again, the conflict in the region fits well with this argument: 
impasses between the Philippine government and the Muslim secessionist 
groups over how best to govern the region; increasing economic neglect and 
political discrimination to the Moro minority; and perhaps most importantly, the 
introduction of radical leaders who had experience in fighting a “jihad” against the 
Soviets in Afghanistan.18     
Terrorism becomes an attractive strategy when the organization feels it 
has no other way to challenge the state’s authority.   Using the ASG as the focus 
of study, it is apparent that they have resorted to terror to demoralize the 
Philippine government.  One of the important leaders of the ASG, Hamsiraji Sali, 
was known to solicit telephone interviews with radio stations following ASG 
strikes where he taunted the Philippine government’s inability to stop his group.  
His actions serve ASG purposes two-fold: they point out the weakness in the 
government, as well as providing immediate international recognition to the ASG 
cause.  The interviews also provide the ASG a means to spread their ideology in 
the hopes of recruiting more followers.   
Modern terrorists and rebel groups, despite their ideology or methods, are 
forced to learn to cope with a covert lifestyle or face operational disaster.  Put 
another way, they must accept that they can never expect the blatantly easy life 
of the outside world which is enjoyed by their enemies.  Namely, that they are 
forced into a life of secrecy and the seemingly insolvable communication 
problems that are inherent to this lifestyle.  Terrorists and rebels must face every 
minute as if it were their last, constantly searching for some semblance of 
normalcy that will elude them.  J. Bower Bell calls this domain the “Dragonworld”, 
where all experience and all objective reality is shaped and modified by belief.  
                                            
18 The founder of the ASG was Abduragak Abubakar Janjalani, who led the group until 
December 1998, when he was killed by police in Lamitan village on Basilan Island. Janjalani was 
a veteran of the Afghan war against the former Soviet Union where he developed close ties with 
other Islamic radical groups. 
9 
This “Dragonworld” is by its nature covert and restrictive, as only true believers 
may enter.  The legitimacy of their cause is without question in this environment, 
which makes any act of terror committed by them justifiable.  Reality is filtered 
out of the equation in the Dragonworld.19   
Bell also spells out the many inherent conflicts that arise due to the covert 
nature of the rebel or terrorist world.  He explains that necessary tasks become 
exceedingly difficult: communication, command and control, etc.  Two recurring 
conflicts are also identified in the terrorist world: an inverse ratio exists between 
secrecy and efficiency.  Absolute secrecy guarantees absolutely that nothing 
works properly; and, a revolutionary ecosphere will assure survival but at the cost 
of competency.  Terrorists also face many other difficulties that their enemies do 
not.  Members are forced to learn to deal with the problems inherent to the 
Dragonworld solely via on the job training.  If they cannot do so efficiently and 
correctly, they usually face quick arrest or death.  Additionally, groups often face 
dramatically different operating areas while in pursuit of their cause.  They may 
face overwhelming support in one area or merely toleration from the population in 
others.  Additionally, both internal communication and external communication 
becomes hampered due to the nature of their covertness; the act of passing 
information does not always transmit to the adequate receipt or understanding of 
that information.20  
Terrorist or rebel organizations are also inherently fractious, with severe 
penalties for division.  History has shown that all long-lived armed struggles 
ultimately split over strategies, priorities, and personalities.  This is also apparent 
in the Philippines: the split of both the MILF and ASG from the MNLF.  Terrorists 
also face tactical dilemmas when they are forced to choose between a flexible or 
rigid command and control structure.  They can either utilize centralized control 
and decision-making, which may result in the loss of initiative by field units, or 
utilize flexible and decentralized decision-making that may endanger the overall 
                                            
19 J. Bowyer Bell, “Aspects of the Dragonworld: Covert Communications and the Rebel 
Ecosystem,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol 3.1 (1989): 17. 
20 J. Bowyer Bell, Revolutionary Dynamics: The Inherent Inefficiency of the Underground 
(London: Frank, Cass & Co., 1990): 206. 
10 
strategic considerations of the group.  Perhaps the most severe constraint faced 
by terrorist groups, which highlights their weakness as compared to the state, is 
“incompetence.”  Terrorist organizations generally lack the assets to be effective 
over time: lack of proper planning, trained volunteers, weapons, supplies, etc.  It 
is this in particular that drives them to utilize tactics which conserve scarce 
resources so as to enable survival of the group: improvised explosive devices, 
attacks on soft targets, etc.   
Terrorist organizations also tend to blur the line between criminal activity 
and terrorism.  As an organization they exhibit a high level of alienation from 
society.  Because of this, they are more likely to push the boundaries of what is 
deemed legitimate behavior- if a kidnapping can bring a new source of income to 
the organization, it is therefore an acceptable option.  Terrorists also tend to 
slowly escalate the level of violence over time.  They build up a moral 
disengagement that makes it easier to justify their behavior, ignoring the 
conventional distinction between combatant and non-combatant and commit 
violence against a wider audience.21  The ASG fits this description well, as they 
have graduated from kidnapping for ransom to extremely deadly bombings 
against civilians, such as the Superferry 14 bombing in February 2004.  
However, this choice of escalating violence against non-combatants by the ASG 
has prompted quick condemnation from the other Muslim separatist groups in the 
region, as they feel it is against Koranic law.  
When all of these constraints are added together it shows that it is very 
hard indeed for a terrorist organization to survive over time.  Terror groups have 
the deck stacked against them from the beginning.  Their world is ripe with 
challenges to their survival: lack of resources, the absolute necessity to remain 
covert, etc.  If the state can recognize and capitalize on these detriments, the 
terrorist organization will cease to exist.  Ultimately, the terrorist organization can 
only hope that it can survive long enough to create enough fear in the target 
population so as to make the state cave in to its demands.   
                                            
21 David Wright-Neville, “Dangerous Dynamics: Activists, Militants and Terrorists in 
Southeast Asia,” Pacific Review (March, 2004): 31. 
11 
C. COMBATING TERROR 
When considering how best to combat terror, it is worth mentioning some 
theoretical works compiled on the subject.  As stated in the previous section, 
terrorist groups have enormous obstacles between them and operational 
success.  In the case of the diminutive ASG, their long-term survival is dependant 
upon areas from which they can run to for sanctuary when they need to rearm or 
regroup.   If the GRP can deny the ASG these areas, it will over time likely lead 
to an end of the ASG threat. 
Martha Crenshaw and Christopher Hewitt, both esteemed scholars in the 
field of terrorism, have provided two works which study various anti-terror 
policies: Crenshaw’s “Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational 
Approaches”, and Hewitt’s The Effectiveness of Anti-terrorist Policies.  
Crenshaw’s work explains that there are two basic explanations for why terrorist 
organizations behave in the ways they do: the Instrumental Approach and the 
Organizational Process Approach.22  She concludes that in order to develop a 
successful anti-terror strategy, one must first understand terrorism and its 
consequences: this can only be accomplished by utilizing an amalgamation of 
both theories.  In comparison, Hewitt utilizes detailed statistical analysis to 
determine the effectiveness of counter-terrorism policies against revolutionary 
and nationalist terrorist organizations.  His research suggests that some policies 
simply do not work at all, in the sense that they have no impact on the overall 
level of violence, and that others are successful in certain situations but not in 
others.  For example, Hewitt found that cease-fires with a terrorist organization 
rarely work in favor of the government; and that in the end it is the terrorist group 
that actually gains.23  This fact became blatantly clear in July 2000 when,  
 
 
                                            
22 Crenshaw’s Instrumental Approach theory (IAT) purports that violence is intentional; 
terrorism is a means to a political end.  The organization uses terror as a convenient strategy.  In 
contrast Crenshaw’s Organizational Process Approach states that terrorist behavior represents 
the outcome of the internal dynamics of the organization rather than strategic action. 
23 Christopher Hewitt,  The Effectiveness of Anti-terrorist Policies. (New York: Lanham, 
University Press of America, 1984): 41-54. 
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following a four month AFP campaign against the MILF, the MILF was able to 
reclaim many of its camps that had been captured during the offensive (see 
Chapter II for more detail). 
Focusing on Southeast Asia, Dr. Zachary Abuza, in his work Balik-
Terrorism, contends that the efforts to combat the ASG have been stymied by the 
protection offered to the ASG by the MILF.  He also suggests that certain key 
MILF commanders would not support any peace agreement between the MILF 
leadership and the Philippine government that did not include outright 
independence for the Muslim areas of the southern Philippines.  If this were the 
case, the MILF might fractionalize which could result in hard-line elements joining 
even more closely with JI and Abu Sayyaf- undoubtedly leading to more terrorist 
operations.24   
In contrast to this view, the Philippine government is operating on the 
assumption that the MILF, with Ebrhim el Haj Murad as chairman, sincerely 
wants a compromise peace and opposes collaboration with the Abu Sayyaf.25  
However, there is yet another theory by some analysts that the MILF leadership 
has a relationship with radical MILF commands similar to that between the 
political organization, Sinn Fein, and its armed wing, the Irish Republican Army.  
According to this theory, the MILF leadership is acting as a front for the hard-line 
commands, shielding them from moves against them by the Philippine 
government and the AFP.26  
D. MAJOR QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENT 
Many questions arise upon close inspection of the actions taken against 
the ASG in the Southern Philippines.  What is the root cause of the violence in 
the Southern Philippines?  What has been done or could be done to remedy the 
                                            
24 Abuza, 39. 
25 S. P. Harish, The GRP-MILF Peace Process: The Quest for International and Domestic 
Legitimacy. Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies (19 January 2006): 1. 
26 Niksch, 19. 
13 
situation?  How much support is being provided to the ASG by other separatist 
groups in the region?  Can the ASG survive without this assistance?   
This thesis attempts to answer these questions within the following four 
chapters.  Chapter II will survey the history of Muslim separatist groups in the 
Southern Philippines, and how the fractionalization over agenda resulted in the 
creation of the Abu Sayyaf.  Chapter III will explore the supporting/supported 
relationship between the MILF and the ASG.  It will also examine the methods 
utilized by the ASG to raise, store, and transfer funds used in its operations.  
Chapter IV will then examine attempts by the United States and Philippine 
governments from 2001 to the present to combat the ASG.  The final chapter will 
then detail a three-pronged strategy to eliminate the remaining ASG threat.   
Successful execution of this strategy will bolster regional stability in Southeast 
Asia by defeating one of the targets of the Global War on Terror as well as 
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II. HISTORY OF MUSLIM SEPARATIST GROUPS IN THE 
SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES 
The Republic of the Philippines has been battling insurgent groups of 
differing ideologies for over four decades.  This chapter will detail what 
underlying conditions contributed to the creation of the major Muslim separatist 
groups in the Southern Philippines.  By examining the different groups’ 
motivations as well as how they ultimately fractionalized over agenda, this 
chapter will also explain how the Abu Sayyaf came to be.   
A. ISLAM IN THE PHILIPPINES 
Islam was introduced to Southeast Asia by maritime merchants during the 
12th century.27  In the regions of what is now Indonesia and Malaysia an 
overwhelming majority of the population accepted the Islamic identity, while in 
the Philippines Muslims were to remain a minority.  The Filipino Muslims, also 
called Moros, constitute 5% of the Philippines’ population and are mainly 
concentrated in the southern portion of the archipelago.  Organized under 
independent sultanates, the Moros successfully avoided Spanish conquest and 
became the masters of Mindanao and Sulu, where they originally constituted 98 
percent of the population. 
 Upon the conclusion of the Spanish American war they fell under United 
States sovereignty.  A reluctant colonial power, from the outset the U.S. stated 
that its policy was to slowly groom the Philippines for eventual self-rule.  At the 
time the Philippine commonwealth was established in 1935, government policy 
was already geared toward assimilating the Moros into the larger Philippine 
society.  On July 4, 1946, the United States stuck to their promise and formally 
declared the independence of the Philippines, effectively turning all of its 
inhabitants into citizens of the Republic of the Philippines (RP).   
 
                                            
27 John Gershman, “Moros in the Philippines.” Self-Determinational Regional Conflict Profile. 
http//www.fpif.org/selfdetermination/conflicts/Philippines_body.html. Accessed 5 Jun 2006. 
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Figure 2.   Map of the southern region of the Philippines, including Mindanao and 
the Sulu Archipelago.28 
 
 
Many Southern Muslims viewed this action as a betrayal of trust as the 
vast majority of Moros did not consider themselves Filipinos due to their religious 
and cultural differences, while making the additional claim that as they had never 
been conquered by the Spanish, they deserved to be an independent state.29   
Despite these complaints, some members of the Muslim political elite aligned 
themselves with the policies of the new state, which included state sponsorship 
of a large-scale Christian migration to the Muslim South.  As large Christian 
resettlement communities sprouted quickly in Mindanao from the 1930s onward, 
the Moros became the minority in the land they considered their own.  The 
proportion of Moro inhabitants to the total population fell from 98 percent to 40 
                                            
28 Honorary Philippine Consulate South website, 
http://www.pwsdb.com/FortLauderdalePCG/Maps-Phil.php. Accessed 9 Feb 2007. 
29 Christos Iacovou, From MNLF to Abu Sayyaf: The Radicalization of Islam in the 
Philippines, Institute of Defense Analysis, Greece (July, 2000): 1. 
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percent by 1976, and to around 20 percent currently.30 This migration marked the 
beginning of years of economic neglect and political discrimination, which in turn 
led to the creation of a Muslim nationalist separatist movement in the 1960’s.   
In an attempt to unite the country the Philippine government sent several 
young men from non-elite Muslim families to Manila universities on scholarships 
with the goal of integrating the Muslim minority into the Philippine nation.  In the 
Muslim South, some of these newly educated young men would return to 
become popular separatist leaders as they provided an alternative to the 
established Muslim leaders who had failed to prevent the massive Christian 
migration.31  
Over the next several years the separatist movement slowly achieved 
success as many of those Muslim leaders who had collaborated with the state in 
the 1960’s now joined forces with the separatist leaders.  Concurrently, in an 
effort to quell unrest the Philippine government was integrating rebel 
commanders into the state bureaucracy by offering positions which allowed them 
to govern large numbers of Muslims on the condition of defecting from separatist 
activities.  Numerous violent clashes between the predominately Christian 
government and the Muslim minority continued until the early 1970s.  The 1971 
elections allowed many Christian politicians, armed with the help of President 
Ferdinand Marcos and the ruling party, to capture many provincial and municipal 
offices which had traditionally been held by Muslims.  
 
 
                                            
30 Currently, Muslims in the Philippines make up 5 percent, or around 4 million, of the 
Philippines’ total population of 82 million.  They are geographically concentrated in the islands of 
Mindanao and Sulu in the southern Philippines, where they constitute around 20 percent of the 
region’s population of more than 16 million. They belong to three major (and ten minor) ethno-
linguistic groups: the Maguindanaoans in the Pulangi River Basin of central Mindanao, the 
Maranaos of the Lanao Lake region in central Mindanao, and the Tausugs in the Sulu 
archipelago. Muslims are in the majority in five provinces (Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Basilan, 
Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi) and in the Islamic City of Marawi, which are currently constituents of the 
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Source: United States Institute for Peace. 
“The Mindanao Peace Talks.” Special Report 131. January 2005. www.usip.org. Accessed 9 Feb 
2007. 
31 Iacovou, 2. 
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B. MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (MNLF) AND MORO ISLAMIC 
LIBERATION FRONT (MILF) 
Despite all attempts by the Philippine government, it was unable to pacify 
the growing secessionist sentiments in the South.  Foremost in the secessionist 
struggle was the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), which was formed in 
the late 1960s by a small group of students and intellectuals.  The MNLF was 
chaired by Nur Misuary, who had been a faculty member at the University of 
Philippines.  Misuary argued that only through a free and independent state could 
the Muslims free themselves from corrupt leaders and fully implement Islamic 
institutions. To him, the Moros constituted a separate and distinct people—the 
Bangsamoro people.  With Misuary as the chairman, the stated goal of the MNLF 
is self-determination and independence, defined as a prerequisite for the 
unhindered implementation and enhancement of Islamic institutions among the 
Muslim minority in the Philippines.32 
The secessionist movement grew rapidly after the eruption of violence in 
Cotabato between 1969 and 1971.  This violence prompted President Ferdinand 
Marcos to declare martial law in September 1972, whereupon the government 
began to disarm the Muslim minority.  This led directly to open rebellion as the 
Moros feared both armed Christian groups as well as military retaliation.  The 
peak of the rebellion came in 1975, when the military arm of the MNLF, the 
Bangsa Moro Army, was able to field some 30,000 armed fighters. The AFP 
responded by deploying 70 to 80 percent of its combat forces against them. 
Destruction and casualties, both military and civilian, were immense: an 
estimated 50,000 people were killed.  
In response to the unrest, the Organization of the Islamic Conference 
(OIC) and other Muslim international organizations successfully exerted pressure 
on the Philippine government to negotiate for a peaceful settlement to the conflict 
which resulted in the Tripoli Agreement of December 1976.  The Philippine 
government officials and MNLF leaders agreed to a settlement which called for a 
cease-fire and granted autonomy to thirteen predominantly Muslim provinces.  
                                            
32 Iacovou, 3. 
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Unwilling to accept the negotiations with the RP government, the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF) was formed in 1977 when Hashim Salamat, supported by 
ethnic Maguindanaos from Mindanao, split from the MNLF.33  The MILF, fielding 
around 9,000 troops, refused to accept the accord and initiated a brief offensive 
primarily against the Philippine security forces which ended in a truce later that 
month. Unfortunately, the truce did not last and conflict continued sporadically 
until the most recent cease-fire agreement was signed in 2003.34 
By mid 1977 the separatist struggle in the Southern Philippines had slowly 
transformed into a popular-based, relatively peaceful movement marked by 
isolated clashes with the RP government.35  With the collapse of the Marcos 
regime in 1985, MNLF leaders, with widespread support from ordinary Muslims, 
entered into main-stream popular politics with the goal of political autonomy for 
Philippine Muslims.36  In 1996, the MNLF signed an agreement relinquishing its 
goal of independence for Muslim regions and many of its troops were assimilated 
into the AFP as well as the Philippine National Police force.   
MILF military activity, which was primarily aimed at the Philippine security 
forces, continued at a relatively low level throughout the 1980s. Following a 1989 
referendum, the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was 
established, based in Cotabato, consisting of the four provinces of Tawi-Tawi, 
Sulu, Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur. In 2001 it was expanded to include the 
island of Basilan and Marawai City in central Mindanao (See Fig. 3).  Many 
previous leaders of the MNLF joined the political institutions of this body. 
However, the MILF strongly rejected the ARMM as a legitimate institution, 
believing it to be wrought with corruption and unable to succeed in the stated 
goal of the MILF: complete Muslim independence in the Southern Philippines. 
                                            
33 Intelligence Resource Program website,  http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/milf.htm.  
Accessed 4 Jun 2006.  
34 Paul A. Rodell, “The Philippines and the Challenge of International Terrorism,” in 
Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia : Transnational Challenges to States and Regional 
Stability. Ed. by Paul J. Smith, ed. (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2005): 129. 
35 D. R. SarDesai, Southeast Asia, Past and Present.  Fifth edition. (California, Westview 
Press, 2003): 218. 
36 Iacovou, 4. 
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Figure 3.   Provinces in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao.37 
 
 
Up through the mid 1990s the MILF conducted numerous operations 
against the AFP and select members of the Philippine government.  It also 
focused its violence against Christian communities in the form of arson and bomb 
attacks on churches as well as murders in remote Christian villages.  In April 
1995 the MILF committed its worst atrocity to date when a group of guerrillas 
from the MILF and members of the Abu Sayyaf raided the town of Ipil and 
massacred over 50 people.  They also took over 30 others hostage whom they 
later killed.  The violence did not stop here as yet more MILF members 
conducted another attack on a cinema in Iligan, Mindanao which resulted in the 
deaths of another 14 people.38  In 2000, the MILF attacked a bus carrying 
Christian plantation workers, resulting in 13 murdered and 14 injured.  
As the Muslim insurgency in the Southern Philippines was becoming 
increasingly costly in terms of both men and equipment, the Estrada 
administration was prompted to initiate several attempts at a ceasefire with the 
                                            
37 United States Institute for Peace. “The Mindanao Peace Talks.” Special Report 131. 
January 2005. www.usip.org. Accessed 9 Feb 2007. 
38 Maria Ressa, Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qaeda's Newest Center of 
Operations in Southeast Asia. (New York, Free Press, 2003): 41-43.  
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MILF.39  In early 2000, MILF military and political confidence grew against the 
backdrop of the first ceasefire attempt, thereby signifying the beginning a 
dangerous game of military brinkmanship. The MILF sought Manila's recognition 
of its military camps as well as a demilitarized zone.  Much to the consternation 
of the AFP commanders, recognition of this sort would create areas in which the 
MILF would be free to train and recruit.40  Ultimately, neither the AFP nor the 
MILF gave the DMZ any regard, as both launched sporadic attacks against the 
other with each side blaming the other for the ceasefire violation.  
By April 2000 the AFP had grown tired of the stalemate and began a four-
month campaign against the MILF supported by sustained air and artillery 
bombardments.  This offensive was described by Manila as operations to free a 
major highway from MILF control.   However, military operations extended 
beyond the disputed highway and concluded only after government troops 
established control over 47 major and satellite MILF camps.   The greatest coup 
for the AFP was the capture of Camp Abu Bakr in July.  Unfortunately, the AFP 
flaunted its success by hosting then-president Joseph Estrada at a celebration 
with beer and roast pork near the ruins of the camp's main mosque.  This 
obviously was a tremendous insult to the Muslim community. 
The four-month campaign against the MILF appeared to be a banner 
success to the GRP as it both boosted both AFP morale and President Estrada's 
public image in the Christian north.  Upon further inspection, the campaign 
provided questionable results.  The AFP did in fact achieve its military goals of 
disproving MILF claims that they had graduated from predominately guerilla 
operations to a credible conventional war-fighting capability.41  But this success 
                                            
39  De Castro, “Adjusting to the Post-U.S. Bases Era,” 121. 
40 This is exactly what Christopher Hewitt discovered in his work The Effectiveness of Anti-
terrorist Policies.  Hewitt examined the governments’ responses to terrorism and analyzes the six 
separate counter-terrorist polices that were implemented in the various countries.  One of Hewitt’s 
conclusions was that when states consider negotiating a ceasefire with the terrorists, the data 
shows that prudence is necessary and that a ceasefire is often a short-sighted policy. 
Negotiations between the state and the terrorist organization will not lead to resolution of the 
conflict.  Furthermore, Hewitt found that if the ceasefire is protracted the terrorist organization 
rather than the government ends up benefiting the most. 
41 Renato Cruz, “Addressing International Terrorism in Southeast Asia: A  Matter of 
Strategic or Functional Approach?” Contemporary Southeast Asia (Aug. 2004): 4.  
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came at a cost, as it not only was a huge drain on the AFP's budget, but it also 
required large numbers of troops to remain in the area to prevent MILF re-
infiltration of its six major camps.  The campaign also resulted in over 600,000 
displaced persons, of which most were Muslim.  This, coupled with the AFP’s 
disregard for cultural sensitivities as exhibited in the Camp Abu Bakr celebration, 
provided ample motivation for new recruits into the MILF.   
C. THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP (ASG) 
As discussed in the previous section, despite early Philippine attempts at 
resolution, the Muslim separatist movement had grown in strength over time, with 
different factions splitting off along the way. Of those groups who split off from 
the mainstream, perhaps the most violent Muslim separatist group operating in 
the region is the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), or “Bearer of the Sword”.  The group 
split from the much larger MNLF in the early 1990s with the intent of establishing 
an Islamic state based on Sharia law on the islands of Mindanao and the Sulu 
Archipelago.42   
The ASG rejected the non-violent practices adopted by the MNLF as the 
ASG prefers violent struggle, or “Jihad”, as its ideological strategy.  The ASG 
successfully competed with the MNLF for the leadership of the Moros’ national 
struggle, successfully taking advantage of a pre-existing Islamic trend within the 
MNLF.   During the 1970’s and 1980’s the Moros nationalist main-stream political 
force did nothing to inhibit the Islamists’ increased participation in the armed 
struggle against the Philippine government as they acknowledged the radicals’ 
contributions to the overall effort to drive the government to make political and 
territorial concessions.  In 1996 the ASG split away from the MNLF as they were 
bitterly opposed to the apparent concessions that were being introduced in the 
peace process between the Philippines and the MNLF.43   
                                            
42 Simon Elegant, “The Return of Abu Sayyaf,” Time Magazine, (Aug 2004). 
http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/article/0,13673,501040830-686107,00.html. Accessed 
21 April 2006. 
43 Ibid., 1. 
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Abubakar Janjalani, the son of a fisherman on Basilan Island, originally 
formed the Abu Sayyaf Group in the early 1990s.  While fighting against the 
former Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s, Janjalani had become 
connected with a Muslim fundamentalist movement called the Al Islamic Tabligh.  
Janjalani continued his studies in Saudi Arabia and Libya where he became 
radicalized.  When he returned to Basilan, he recruited two groups into the ASG: 
dissidents from the MNLF and as well as other Filipinos who had fought with the 
Afghan mujaheddin.   Janjalani led the ASG until December 1998, when he was 
killed by police in Lamitan village on Basilan.  After his death, his brother, 
Khaddafy Janjalani, emerged as the ASG’s new leader and consolidated power 
until his death during a firefight with the AFP in December, 2006.44  Despite this 
change in leadership the ASG claim to an Islamic ideology with a focus on Jihad 
still guides their radical objectives and strategy.45  Although the ASG presents 
itself as a legitimate secessionist organization, the facts tell a different tale.   
Slowly refining their use of violence as a policy tool, the ASG have 
transformed into a credible terrorist organization.  In the early 1990s the ASG is 
reported to have received funding from Al Qaeda through Mohammad Jamal 
Khalifa, who was Osama bin Laden’s brother-in-law.  Additionally, Ramzi Yousef, 
a known Al Qaeda operative, visited Basilan Island in 1995, where he reportedly 
trained 20 ASG members.  Following this visit, Yousef established an Al Qaeda 
cell in Manila where he planned several attacks including: an assassination of 
Pope John Paul II, the planting of bombs aboard 12 U.S. airliners flying trans-
Pacific routes, as well as a plan to crash an airplane into the Central Intelligence 
Agency’s headquarters in Langley, Virginia.  The plots were uncovered by the 
Philippine National Police in 1995 as they were investigating a fire in Yousef’s 
Manila apartment.  Yousef was later arrested in Pakistan and extradited to the 
United States for trial over his complicity in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade 
Center.46 
                                            
44 United States Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism (2004): 93. 
45 Iacovou, 7. 
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Ultimately, it was the ASG’s choice of sensational terrorist actions, like 
bombings and kidnappings of foreigners, that placed the ASG on the 
international agenda, as well as adding their name to the U.S. government’s list 
of Foreign Terrorist Organizations in October, 1997.47  In April 1995 the ASG 
undertook its first large-scale action against the town of Ipil in Mindanao, which 
resulted in 53 deaths.  By the year 2000 the ASG began to use terror primarily for 
financial profit, engaging in kidnappings for ransom, assassinations, and 
extortion.  In April of 2000, an ASG faction kidnapped 21 persons, including 10 
Western tourists, from a resort in Malaysia where they gained nearly $20 million 
USD in ransom from the governments of Malaysia, Libya, Germany and 
France.48  It was these events as well as the group’s ties to Al Qaeda that would 
soon draw increased scrutiny from the United States.  The extent of the U.S. 
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III. MILF-ASG INTERRELATIONSHIP 
A. BACKGROUND 
The MILF has waged a secessionist campaign in the southern Philippines 
since 1978, when they broke away from the secular MNLF.  Their avowed goal is 
to establish an independent homeland for the Moro peoples that will be governed 
by Sharia law (Islamic law).49 Though initially armed and supported by the Libyan 
and Malaysian governments, by the early 1990s, the MILF had lost much of its 
state support. It was at this time that it began to establish links with the Abu 
Sayyaf Group.   
By 1991, both the MILF and the ASG were funded through a financial 
network established by Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, Osama bin Laden’s brother-
in-law.  Khalifa, officially the regional director for the Saudi-based charity Islamic 
International Relief Organization (IIRO), was dispatched to the Philippines in 
1991 to establish a network of Islamic charities.50  As with most of the Islamic 
charities that have been implicated in terrorist financing, Khalifa’s charities did in 
fact provide some necessary services to the Moros.51  
The IIRO’s charitable activities provided much needed infrastructure to the 
Moros in Mindanao, including the construction of an orphanage and dispensary 
in Cotabato City and dispensaries and pharmacies in Zamboanga.  The IIRO 
also funded a mobile, floating clinic to serve Muslims in remote areas of western 
Mindanao.  Food and clothing were also provided to many displaced Moros who 
were fleeing the fighting between the separatists and the AFP.  The IIRO was 
also a key contributor to an important front organization of the MILF, the 
Markazzo Shabab Al-Islamiyah (MSI).  Based in Lanao del, Mindanao, the MSI 
was engaged in da’wah and recruitment activities for both the MILF and ASG.  
                                            
49 S. P. Harish, “The GRP-MILF Peace Process: The Quest for International and Domestic 
Legitimacy.” Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies (19 Jan 2006): 1. 
50 Abuza, 5. 
51 International Crisis Group. “Philippines Terrorism: The Role of Militant Islamic Converts.” 
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Additionally, the IIRO used scholarships as an attempt to broaden the base of 
support for the MILF and ASG by recruiting from both rural and urban areas. 
These scholarships were provided to encourage students to become Islamic 
scholars.52   
Although the IIRO was providing funding legitimate relief and livelihood 
projects, it was also channeling funds for the purchase of arms for both the MILF 
and ASG.  According to an interview with an ASG defector by Philippine 
intelligence, only 10 to 30 percent of the foreign funding went to humanitarian 
projects and the rest ended up funding terrorist operations.53  Due to competition 
for these funds the ASG and MILF soon developed a rivalry. 
Despite the ASG-MILF competition over resources, Muhammad Jamal 
Khalifa was also able to forge working ties between the two groups.  Khalifa’s 
IIRO funded the establishment of a mosque/madrasa in Marawi, Mindanao where 
the MILF and ASG sent operatives for religious training before going on to 
military training in camps operated by the MILF.  The school provided almost 150 
cadets between 1990 and 1993.  The classes, of roughly 50 cadets each, were 
divided between MILF and ASG.  Abdurajak Janjalani, the founder of the ASG, 
was a graduate of the class of 1992.54  
In an attempt to bring the two organizations closer together a key al 
Qaeda operative, Omar al-Faruq, was dispatched to the region in 1994-95 by 
Abu Zubaidah.  Al-Faruq was sent to be a trainer at the MILF camps to create a 
stronger jihad force out of the ASG and the MILF.   Due to differences over 
ideology and tactics the division between the MILF and ASG began to widen, as 
the ASG did not consider the MILF to be a reliable jihad partner.  Many of the 
ASG members were also upset that the MILF did not share much of the 
resources and funding from the Saudi charity network established by Mohammed 
Jamal Khalifa.  However, joint training continued at MILF camps through the mid-
                                            
52 Abuza, 5-6. 
53 Ibid., 6. 
54 Ressa, 21. 
27 
1990s due to the presence of al Qaeda trainers, which included Al-Mughirah al-
Gaza’iri and Abu al-Abbas al-Khatami.55   
Following the discovery of the Bojinka Plot56 led by Ramzi Yousef and 
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the ASG began a steady decline. Up to date, the 
Yousef-bin Laden connection had been the major source of their funding, and 
without a steady supply of al Qaeda money, the operations budget began to 
wither.   The ASG was further weakened by a number of arrests and the death of 
their founder, Abdurajak Janjalani in December 1998.  The combination of these 
factors led the ASG to begin a series of violent kidnappings. The group gained 
international notoriety in 2000 with high-profile raids on diving resorts in Palawan 
and Sipidan, Malaysia, which led to the deaths of several tourists, including 
Americans.57  These kidnappings netted the ASG roughly $20 million USD in 
ransom form various Western nations. 
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Philippine President 
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo was quick to offer the use of former U.S. bases, Subic 
Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base, to the U.S. led coalition against international 
terrorism.58  In response to the Philippine declaration of support to the Global 
War on Terror (GWOT), the United States committed almost 1,300 troops and 
$93 million in military aid to assist the Philippine government’s fight against the 
ASG on Basilan Island.  Over a six-month period Philippine forces, with U.S. 
assistance, were able to rout the ASG’s stranglehold on Basilan- forcing the 
remaining ASG to flee to relative sanctuary in areas controlled by the MILF in 
Mindanao and Jolo (this will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter IV).  AFP 
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commanders attributed their successes to U.S. equipment, U.S. intelligence 
gathering, and U.S. assistance in planning AFP operations.59    
During the 2002 U.S.-Philippine bilateral operation against the ASG, an 
MILF spokesman condemned the ASG’s attacks and kidnapping as being 
completely un-Islamic when he stated, “Most of their activities are against Islam. 
We do not sanction most of their activities.”60   This statement was made in an 
effort to distance the MILF from the ASG, as the MILF and the Philippine 
government were currently in a cease-fire agreement.  In fact, during the 2002 
operation exercises, a trilateral agreement was reached between the U.S., the 
AFP and the MILF, to assure the MILF that joint U.S.-Philippine patrols in Basilan 
would not enter MILF-held zones.  Unfortunately this agreement boded especially 
well for the ASG as it allowed them a place to turn to for sanctuary.61  
Following their displacement from Basilan to Mindanao and Jolo, the ASG 
regrouped and resumed sporadic but significant domestic terrorist operations.  In 
fact, since the conclusion of U.S.-Philippine bilateral operations in July of 2002, 
the ASG’s tactics appear to have shifted back from kidnap-for-ransom operations 
to a systematic campaign of bombings.  The first incident was the joint ASG, 
MILF, JI operation that killed a U.S. Special Forces Officer in 2002.  Second, in 
February 2004, ASG operatives with assistance from members of the Rajah 
Solomain Movement (RSM) set an explosive device which blew up and sank 
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Superferry 14 out of Manila, killing 194.62  Third, on Valentine’s Day, 2005, they 
executed a triple bombing across three cities.63   These attacks dictate that the 
group has apparently abandoned their notorious kidnap-for-ransom operations 
and returned to their earlier radical, more politicized agenda in order to expand 
their capabilities and area of operations.   
Zachary Abuza, a renowned Southeast Asia terrorist expert, believes that 
the ASG has shifted back to terrorism due to three factors.  First, there was an 
internal change in leadership within the organization. Abu Sabaya and Ghalib 
Andang, the leaders most responsible for the kidnappings, had been either killed 
or captured.  This allowed Khadaffy Janjalani, the younger brother of the group’s 
founder, to consolidate his leadership and bring the organization back to its 
radical Islamist roots.64   
Second, the ASG was also trying to benefit from the ongoing peace 
process between the GRP and the MILF, which is slowly defusing the primary 
secessionist movement in the southern Philippines.  In this apparent shift in 
doctrine and tactics, Khadaffy Janjalani sought to improve ties with the largest 
independence movement remaining in the southern Philippines, the MILF.  The 
ASG began to search for renegade commanders of the MILF, who they felt would 
reject an autonomy agreement with the government.  Ultimately, the ASG 
believes that strict adherence to a radical Islamist ideology is paramount to their 
group becoming a viable separatist force in the Philippines.   
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Lastly, in 2002, the leaders of Indonesian based Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), 
were suffering attrition due to a number of arrests of operatives that had occurred 
around the region.  That year they decided to forge closer ties with the ASG and 
invited them to begin training with JI within the MILF’s camps in Mindanao- to 
which the ASG readily agreed.65  While the MILF publicly denies the relationship 
with both the ASG and JI, a number of arrests of key JI suspects in the 
Philippines confirmed that JI is providing training to MILF and ASG members in 
MILF camps.66  Furthermore, evidence proves that members of the MILF and 
ASG have been engaging in joint terrorist operations.67  
B. MILF EXPECTATIONS  
Abuza believes the MILF will gain from continued involvement with the 
ASG for three reasons.68  First, it keeps AFP forces spread thin.  Because the 
AFP maintains a limited number of forces in the area, any AFP operations 
against the ASG translates to no operations against the MILF.  Second, it gives 
the MILF a degree of plausible deniability when it chooses to engage in terrorism 
as it can blame the event on the ASG.  As of mid-2003, the MILF is currently 
involved in a Malaysian sponsored peace talk with the Philippine government and 
has a public image to uphold.  Although there is no current proof of formal 
agreements between the ASG and the MILF, continued sightings of ASG fighters 
in MILF controlled camps suggest that some sort or arrangement exists.  
Philippine intelligence sources have observed ASG members using MILF boats 
in Tawi-Tawi, in the Sulu archipelago.  Additionally, there is proof that the MILF 
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has reached out to Khadaffy Janjalani. Reportedly, U.S. signals intercepts have 
tracked Janjalani through several MILF camps where he could not have been 
without explicit MILF approval, knowledge, or support. 69  
Lastly, the MILF is seeking to increase its ties with the differing ethnic and 
social networks throughout the archipelago so they can supplant the MNLF as 
the dominant political voice and action arm of the Bangsamoro people. It is doing 
this via three ways: first, the MILF is catering to the ASG to gain the trust of its 
ethnic Yaccan base.  Second, the MILF is nominating ethnic Tausogs, a 
predominately MNLF ethnic group, into positions of authority within their 
organization.  This is being done to maintain an ethnic and geographical balance 
to the MILF leadership.70   
Ultimately, the MILF clearly hopes to use the ASG to keep government 
forces spread thin and to help build up its network in the Sulu archipelago.  This 
factor, coupled with Janjalani’s rejection of kidnapping in favor of a Moro-national 
liberation struggle, has led to much closer ties between the two organizations.  
Concurrently, hard-line elements of the MILF are predisposed ideologically to the 
more radical ASG and JI71, and are therefore actively creating alliances with 
these two groups.  
C. ASG EXPECTATIONS  
First, the MILF can provide what the ASG does not posses: training, 
infrastructure, firm control over large areas of land, popular support and logistics 
assistance, and help with operations. The ASG is obligated to assist the MILF 
whenever they can as the MILF allows the ASG to exist, operate, train, recruit, 
and raise funds in MILF controlled areas.  Although it appears that this 
relationship is strong, the ASG-MILF relationship does not appear 
institutionalized. Instead, it is stronger with individual commanders of the MILF, 
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and in particular to the 106th and 109th Base Commands (see Figure 4).  In fact, 
the ASG appears to be forging closer ties with commands that are less inclined 
to support the MILF’s senior leadership in the peace process.72 
Regarding funding, the ASG still maintains large amounts of revenue left 
over from its earlier hostage taking operations.  According to Philippine sources, 
ASG earned $20 million USD from ransoms in 2000 and 2001.  The group also 
extorts money from businesses and individuals and has also engaged in 
marijuana-growing operations.  The ASG is also known to levy “revolutionary 
taxes” on the populations in some of their operating areas.  Lastly, the ASG gains 
approximately 4,000 to 10,000 pesos per month from protection money charged 
against both individuals and businesses.73 
                                            
72 A JI operative in charge of liaison work and training of the ASG, Rohmat (aka Zaki), was 
arrested at a military checkpoint while exiting the MILF’s 109th Base Command.  He provided that 
both JI and ASG training was being conducted at the MILF’s 103rd and 109th Base Commands.  
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As detailed in the previous sections, the MILF and the ASG are in a 
mutually beneficial relationship.  The MILF gains in three ways: first, the ASG 
keeps AFP forces occupied; second, the leadership of the MILF gains plausible 
deniability whenever a terrorist attack does occur as it can simply blame the 
event on the ASG; and lastly, it is able to tap into another ethnic base in order to 
bolster its regional agenda.  The ASG gains are more obvious: shelter, weapons, 
and funding.   
Despite the possibility of the successful implementation of the Malaysian-
sponsored peace agreement between the MILF leaders and the Philippine 
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government, this will not completely diminish the MILF-ASG relationship.  Some 
key MILF commanders may rebel against the MILF leadership as they might 
reject any plan which does not guarantee outright independence for the Muslim 
areas of the southern Philippines.  If this were the case, the MILF hardliners 
could possibly transfer their allegiance to JI and the ASG.  This shift would 
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IV. U.S. AND PHILIPPINE RESPONSE 
As detailed in the previous chapters, it was the ASG’s choice of 
sensational terrorist actions, like bombings and kidnappings of foreigners that 
placed the ASG on the international agenda. By 2000, the ASG had become 
quite successful in their endeavors, as they had gained nearly $20 million USD in 
ransom from the governments of Malaysia, Libya, Germany and France.76  It was 
these events as well as the group’s ties to Al Qaeda that would soon draw 
increased scrutiny from both the U.S. and Philippine governments. 
A. OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM-PHILIPPINES 
Following the 9/11 terror attacks, Philippine President Gloria Macapagal 
Arroyo quickly offered up the use of the former U.S. bases, Subic Bay Naval 
Base and Clark Air base to the United States, stating that the Philippines was 
“ready to pay a price” to support the GWOT.  Concurrently, she issued a 14-
stage counterterrorism campaign to enhance intelligence sharing with the U.S. 
and other coalition members.77  President Bush, in response to the offer of 
unequivocal Philippine support, offered the possibility of U.S. military involvement 
in the AFP campaign against the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Southern 
Philippines.78  Prior to 9/11, Philippine government policy had been to apply 
military pressure to the Abu Sayyaf Group who, on May 27, 2001, had kidnapped 
three U.S. citizens and 17 Filipinos from a tourist resort in Palawan, Philippines.  
Several of the hostages, including one U.S. citizen, were murdered.  However, 
AFP attempts to rescue the hostages had been ineffective due to several factors: 
difficult terrain, inadequate Philippine equipment, avoiding clashes with the MNLF 
and the MILF, as well as relatively high instances of corruption in the AFP.79 
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In November 2001, the two nations signed an interim arrangement that 
gave the United States access to storing military weapons and supplies in the 
Philippines, the right to permanent over-flight, and approval to build temporary 
camps for U.S. troops in support of the GWOT.80  These moves were seen by 
the United States as key to upgrading American military links in Southeast Asia 
in order to prevent the region from becoming a new safe haven for international 
terrorists, thereby denying Al Qaeda a new home base and access to human and 
material resources.   
The United States and the Philippines also approved a cohesive training 
plan for the AFP, delivery of new equipment to enhance AFP mobility, as well as 
the creation of a new bilateral consultative mechanism.  After 9/11, the 
Philippines received a ten-fold increase in U.S. military assistance, from $1.9 
million USD in 2001, to $19 million in 2002.  The large list of new equipment 
provided by the Foreign Military Funding program included a C-130B Hercules 
transport aircraft, eight UH-1H Iroquois helicopters, 30,000 M-16s, grenade 
launchers, mortars, sniper rifles, night vision and thermal imaging devices, as 
well as a 360-ton Cyclone class coastal patrol craft.81  New U.S. security 
assistance also included the training of anti-terrorism Light Reaction Companies 
of the AFP, as well as other programs designed to enhance overall AFP 
capabilities.82 
The United States and the Philippines also authorized the participation of 
over 4000 U.S. troops on Luzon in the annual bilateral exercise Balikatan 
(translated “Shoulder to Shoulder”).   Under the framework of Balikatan an 
additional deployment of almost 1,300 troops, including 160 U.S. Special Forces 
personnel (SOF), were deployed to the Southern Philippine island of Basilan to 
aid the AFP in its operations against the Abu Sayyaf.  The U.S. Special Forces 
personnel were given the mission of advising, training and assisting the AFP on 
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counterterrorism operations, with the other troops in a support role: building 
infrastructure to support the operation, including road projects, digging wells, and 
providing economic and humanitarian assistance to the local population.  This 
deployment was to be known as Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-
P).83   
In keeping with the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, the U.S. goal of 
OEF-P was to promote the development of professional armed forces in the 
area, while holding firm to the notion that the U.S. would only maintain temporary 
bases instead of a permanent forward deployed force.84  Unlike previous Cold 
War strategy, where the United States maintained a forward deployed force to 
ensure security of major Asian air and sea lanes, this deployment was to 
encourage and assist governments in neutralizing terrorist organizations that 
threatened their own countries and global security.  A secondary goal was to 
better prepare the AFP for providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, 
as well as aiding in future United Nations Peacekeeping missions.  During OEF-
P, the U.S. troops deployed to the Southern Philippines were relegated to a 
purely supporting role: they were allowed to patrol with the AFP but they could 
not engage in combat, as they were instructed to merely observe and assess the 
performance of their Filipino counterparts.85  To complement the U.S. ground 
force presence, the United States also made some of its national signals 
intelligence (SIGINT) assets available to the operation.  
One of the best examples of U.S. intelligence and operational support to 
the AFP came in late June, 2002, when a Philippine Marine patrol boat, equipped 
with night-vision goggles and guided by U.S. intelligence assets, was able to 
ambush one of the senior ASG leaders.  Abu Sabaya, spokesman for the ASG, 
had been under surveillance for weeks prior to the operation as U.S. Special 
Forces had surreptitiously installed a transponder in the foam padding of his 
backpack.  The United States also provided airborne terminal guidance during 
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the ambush by directing a laser designator at the rebel boat, thereby allowing the 
Philippine Navy to track it with their night-vision goggles.  After the Philippine 
Navy intercepted the boat in the open ocean, a brief firefight erupted which 
resulted in the death of Sabaya and the capture of several other ASG 
members.86   
U.S. intelligence assets did suffer limitations in their employment during 
the unconventional aspects of the operation.  In fact, the rules of engagement led 
directly to an over-reliance on U.S. technical reconnaissance assets.  Unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs) and a P3 Orion reconnaissance aircraft were provided by 
the United States to locate the ASG and the hostages on Basilan.  The rationale 
for technical reconnaissance assets was force protection as their employment 
would minimize risks to U.S. personnel who were precluded from patrolling with 
their AFP counterparts.  According to the U.S. SOF commander, the use of these 
platforms did reduce patrolling in remote areas, but the UAV surveillance was 
extremely conventional as it only serviced specific named areas of interest (NAI).  
The NAIs supported the higher headquarters’ (the joint task force level) priority 
intelligence requirements, but due to long lag times in the dissemination of this 
information the AFP and SOF forces on the ground were unable to exploit the 
available reconnaissance assets.87  Gracia Burnham, the surviving American 
hostage, described the ineffectiveness of the airborne intelligence assets in her 
memoir: "[We] heard a spy plane circling overhead, [but our captors] ignored 
them because they had been circling for months and nothing ever happened." 88  
Ultimately, mostly due to AFP over-reliance on conventional search and 
destroy missions in the jungles of Basilan, the operation was a mixed success.  
During a botched AFP hostage recovery operation on June 7, 2002, U.S. 
hostage Gracia Burnham was rescued, but her husband Martin Burnham and a 
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Filipina nurse, Deborah Yap, were killed by AFP bullets.89  The ASG, although it 
suffered large losses of manpower and material, was not eliminated as it shifted 
its base of operations to both Mindanao and Jolo.90  However, the operation was 
successful in that United States was able to increase the AFP’s overall combat 
capabilities.   
Arguably, the biggest gains of OEF-P in 2002 appear to be political rather 
than military.  OEF-P successfully strengthened domestic political support for a 
revitalized U.S.-Philippine alliance as it enhanced the Philippine government’s 
programs of social reform and poverty alleviation in some of the poorest parts of 
the nation.  The infrastructure left behind, in the form of new roads, bridges, and 
water projects, indicated lasting proof that the Philippine government was indeed 
committed to improving the lives of its citizens in the Muslim South.  Prior to 
2002, the ASG had successfully put a strangle-hold on Basilan Island until the 
U.S.-Philippine bilateral response was able to break it.  Non-governmental 
organizations had left stockpiles of medicine, building materials and bridges on 
the island that could not be delivered to the population due to fear.   
In the end, the combined military and humanitarian assistance to Basilan 
Island successfully freed the inhabitants of the ASG’s reign of terror, forcing the 
group to go elsewhere.  On a grander scale the operation led to further U.S. 
commitments to the Philippines in the form of $4.6 billion worth of continued 
economic and military assistance.  The GRP used these funds to continue the 
implementation of its modernization programs for the AFP so that it would be 
more capable of handing the country’s myriad of internal security problems.91 
B. EXERCISES AND OPERATIONS FROM 2002-2003 
Following the successful 2002 U.S.-Philippine operations against the ASG 
on Basilan, Balikatan and other annual exercises were allowed to continue- with 
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counter-terrorism training remaining the objective of each successive exercise.92  
During President Arroyo’s state visit to Washington in 2003, President Bush 
designated the Philippines a Major Non-NATO ally and also promised increased 
U.S. military assistance.93  In early 2003, the United States and the Philippines 
attempted to launch a similar operation against the remaining Abu Sayyaf 
members in the Sulu Archipelago.  However, due to difficulties resolving the rules 
of engagement for U.S. forces as well as the question whether or not the 
Philippine Constitution allowed foreign troops to be exposed to combat, this 
operation was postponed.94   
Despite this setback, the large change in annual U.S. assistance had 
substantially increased the combat capabilities of the AFP.  Bolstered by this, 
hardliners in the Philippine defense establishment decided to seize the initiative 
on Mindanao in 2003.  Publicly stating their intentions were against the Pentagon 
Gang and other criminal elements that were reportedly hiding in MILF camps, in 
early February the AFP attacked a MILF outpost in Pikit, North Cotabato.95  They 
followed this with an offensive supported by artillery on the MILF controlled 
village of Buliok, which was also the hometown of the Chairman of the MILF, 
Salamat Hashim.  This attack was quickly protested by the MILF, as they felt it 
was an assassination attempt against Hashim, who, along with town residents 
were gathered in prayer marking Eid-ul-Adha, a Muslim holy day celebrating the 
end of the Hajj.  AFP intelligence responded to these charges by publicly 
displaying evidence from Hashim’s home that included boxes of documents that 
included manuals on assassination, ambush and bombing techniques.96 
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In a strange twist of events, the Philippine government first ordered a halt 
to the attack and then reversed itself 24 hours later.  This was partially explained 
when President Arroyo, weary of the constant battles between the AFP and 
MILF, released a statement that specified that the attack was not aimed at the 
MILF, claiming that “… the GRP was duty-bound to uphold the rule of law and to 
neutralize all armed criminal elements in Mindanao, wherever they may be.”97  
She did this in an attempt to salvage her administration’s attempts at brokering a 
peace agreement with the MILF.98 
However, within days of this particular speech, AFP Chief of Staff Dionisio 
Santiago came on record that the recent campaign was not merely aimed at 
lawless elements and that it was directly in response to the massing of MILF 
forces in the area.  With that, the offensive continued.  By the end of March, 2003 
several hundred had been killed with more than 50,000 people displaced from 
their homes.  This campaign outraged the MILF and other Muslims in the region 
and subsequently created the impetus for an increase in anti-Christian violence 
on Mindanao.  The AFP soon accused the MILF of being behind a pair of 
bombings in predominately Christian Davao City which killed a combined total of 
38 people in March and April 2003.  The AFP also postulated that the MILF may 
have been planning on extending its bombing campaign to Metro Manila.  In 
response, the MILF denied all allegations stating that they did not target civilians, 
and that their operations were a merely a form of active self-defense.99  
By mid-2003 the AFP shifted its heightened military posture to what they 
called “punitive action.”  AFP vice chief of staff Rodolfo Garcia, announced that 
the military would begin to actively pursue MILF units accused of crimes against 
civilian populations.  Following the two Davao bombings, the Philippine 
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government posted arrest warrants and bounties for the top leaders of the MILF, 
including Chairman Hashim and spokesman Kabula.100  The AFP continued this 
approach until late June with little to no progress on a ceasefire agreement nor 
on identifying the culprits of the Davao bombings. 
The MILF maintained that they would only return to the negotiating table if 
the AFP completely withdrew from Buliok.  The GRP countered that the MILF 
must denounce terrorism and sever all ties with terrorist organizations.  Soon 
after, MILF chairman Salamat issued a public statement rejecting terrorism and 
denying his group’s ties to terrorist organizations.  In July 2003, Salamat died of 
natural causes, and Al Haj Murad Ebrahim, the group’s vice chairman for military 
affairs, was named the MILF’s new leader.   
In a show of good faith, the GRP lifted the arrest warrants issued against 
the MILF leaders for the series of bombings in the Philippines and withdrew its 
forces out of the MILF headquarters in Buliok.  With these developments, the 
stage was set for the resumption of the formal talks on substantive issues in the 
secessionist conflict. 
C. MALAYSIAN SPONSORED CEASEFIRE 
Tiring of the constant impasses with negotiating directly with the MILF, the 
Philippine Government accepted the assistance of Malaysia.  With the assistance 
of the Malaysian government, a new cease-fire agreement was signed. With it, 
the Arroyo administration began preparing for the resumption of negotiations with 
the MILF in October 2003.  The first round of exploratory talks was held between 
the GRP and MILF in Kuala Lumpur which began to discuss the specifics of the 
ceasefire.  By late 2004, both Malaysia and Brunei would send teams to 
Mindanao to assist in monitoring the ceasefire agreement.101   
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To facilitate negotiations on ancestral domain, government and MILF 
panels formed working groups in December 2004 to try to arrive at common 
understandings of the four sub-issues of ancestral domain: concept, territory, 
governance, and resources.  The next stage of peace talks were held in Kuala 
Lumpur in February 2005, and discussed the most contentious issue between 
the GRP and MILF- ancestral domain.  To date, the GRP refuted the MILF’s draft 
proposal on ancestral domain as it was too broad.  In it, the MILF defines 
ancestral domain as “all lands and areas, including the environment and natural 
resources therein of the Bangsamoro people, established through occupation, 
possession, and dominion since time immemorial by cultural bond, customary 
law, historic rights, and legal titles”.102 
Thus far the talks have yet to demonstrate substantial progress as time 
appears to be on the side of the GRP, as the MILF continues to bargain from a 
position of relative weakness due to a lack of military strength and other 
resources.  The MILF is also wary of the sincerity of the GRP as they feel the 
GRP is using the peace process as a tool to fragment and sow dissension within 
the MILF.    Another potential problem facing the talks is the fact that some U.S 
policy makers would like to include the MILF on the State Department's list of 
foreign terrorist organizations.  If this happens, it would de-legitimize the 
negotiations, as it would show to the international community that the GRP was 
openly negotiating with a known terrorist group.103 
D.  EXERCISES AND OPERATIONS FROM 2005-2006 
By 2005, the United States and the Philippines had come to a mutual 
agreement on how U.S. forces could legally assist the AFP in its hunt against the 
ASG.  Thus, the U.S. once again committed forces to the region with the task of 
direct support missions for the Philippine military in western Mindanao against 
Abu Sayyaf, as well as non-combat missions on the Abu Sayyaf sanctuary of 
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Jolo Island.  U.S. officials had expressed growing concern over the presence of 
JI on Mindanao as well as the presence of alleged links between JI and the 
MILF.  The Bush Administration hoped that if it supported the ongoing peace 
talks between the Philippine government and the MILF, it might be finally able to 
break the MILF-JI ties.104  The U.S. also understood that coordination among 
Abu Sayyaf, JI, and elements of the MILF presented the possibility of a wider 
terrorist war in the Philippines.  For this reason the United States opted not for 
combat operations but instead for continuing its support role of providing advice, 
training and assistance to the AFP.105  
From 2001 to 2005, over 30 annual joint U.S.-Philippine military exercises 
occurred throughout the Philippines (for a comprehensive list of annual exercises 
see Appendix II).  These exercises were all planned under the auspices of the 
Mutual Defense Board and Visiting Forces Agreement, and agreed upon by both 
governments. These exercises continued to provide training, humanitarian 
assistance projects, information-sharing and other activities that would increase 
the counter-terror capabilities of the AFP.  Exercise Balikatan 2006, held from 20 
Feb - 5 Mar 06, would be the most robust operation held since 2002 with 
approximately 5,500 U.S. personnel and 2,800 Armed Forces of the Philippines 
personnel participating.  However, due to the rules of engagement and 
constitutional problems that arose in 2003, plans were made to keep U.S. forces 
away from any areas where combat with the ASG was likely. 
During Balikatan 2006, under the Project Bayanihan – an initiative 
provided for in Mutual Defense Treaty, seven Medical Civic Action Programs 
(MEDCAPs), four Engineering Civic Action Projects (ENCAPs), a staff exercise, 
and military training were conducted jointly between the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines (AFP) and U.S. Military simultaneously on the Islands of Cebu, Luzon 
and Sulu.  Assisted by U.S. Military, the AFP was responsible for security 
throughout the exercise.  Successes of the exercise included free medical and 
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dental care to over 11,000 Filipinos, veterinary care for animals, as well as the 
construction of four new school buildings.  As is the case of previous Balikatan 
exercises, all infrastructures built to support the operations would remain after 
the withdrawal of the U.S. forces.  Perhaps most memorable was the immediate 
response by the U.S. to a devastating landslide which destroyed the town of 
Guinsaugon, in Southern Leyte.106   
Upon the closure of the Exercise and in accordance with agreements 
made between the United States and the Philippine governments, Project 
Bayanihan and other humanitarian and civic action programs were scheduled to 
continue in Mindanao.107 
E. OP PLAN ULTIMATUM 
In August 2006, the Philippine government ordered the AFP to begin an 
intense campaign against the Abu Sayyaf in the Sulu archipelago.  Named Op 
Plan Ultimatum, over 7,000 AFP were ordered into the area with the sole mission 
of eradication of the ASG.  Once again supported by U.S.-supplied training, 
intelligence and money, the AFP began to achieve unprecedented operational 
successes against the ASG on the islands of Jolo and Tawi Tawi.   The offensive 
resulted in the death of Khaddafy Janjalani in Pakitul, Jolo on Sep 4, 2006 as 
well as his second-in-command, Abu Solaiman, on January 16, 2007.  Armed 
with U.S. signals intelligence, the AFP was also able to ascertain that the JI 
explosives expert Dulmatin, possible engineer of the 2002 Bali night club 
bombings, was wounded in a firefight on January 16, 2007.108 
                                            
106 Just prior to the start of Balikatan 2006, a devastating mudslide destroyed the city of 
Guinsaugon, on the Southern Philippine island of Leyte.  Fortunately, as Balikatan was about to 
commence, a large U.S. force presence was in the area who was ready to provide support to the 
Philippine government. Within hours, more than 2,500 U.S. forces were diverted to assist in the 
search and rescue operation on Leyte.  The U.S. military role was to provide immediate, life-
sustaining support, in order to mitigate any additional loss of life or human suffering in the areas 
affected by the landslide.  The venue of Exercise Balikatan enabled the U.S. and Philippine 
governments to work closely together to coordinate an immediate humanitarian 
assistance/disaster relief response to this emergency. 
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In a late January 2007 interview Armed Forces Joint Task Force Comet 
commander Ruben Rafael commented that the AFP would now focus on 
neutralizing the two remaining leaders of the Abu Sayyaf, Radullan Sahiron and 
Isnilon Hapilon as well as JI leaders Omar Patek and the wounded Dulmatin.109  
Despite the attrition of the ASG forces, Rafael also concluded that Op Plan 
Ultimatum is unlikely to completely wipe out the remaining ASG, as the group is 
deeply entrenched in the jungles of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago.  
However, constant military pressure and continued elimination of the group’s 
leadership will continue to have a negative impact on the ASG’s ability to both 
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V. CONCLUSION 
As outlined in the previous chapters, the Philippine government has been 
struggling to find a lasting solution to the lingering threat poised by the Abu 
Sayyaf Group.  Year by year, the GRP has consistently relied on mainly 
conventional warfare type approaches.  In fact, due to the remaining ASG threat, 
all bilateral exercises between the United States and the Philippines since 2002 
have been focused on increasing AFP counter-terrorism capabilities.110  It cannot 
be refuted that the AFP’s counter-terror capabilities have indeed been increased, 
as demonstrated by the successes during Balikatan 2002 on Basilan Island and 
the more recent Op Plan Ultimatum in Sulu.  However, this thesis contends that 
this strategy, although still necessary, is not the most effective way of eliminating 
the remaining Abu Sayyaf threat as it does not solve the problem of how to 
completely eradicate the group.  Instead, I propose that the U.S. assist the GRP 
in developing the following three-pronged approach as detailed in the following 
sections.   
A. U.S. ASSISTANCE TO THE RP/MILF PEACE PROCESS 
First, that the United States should focus more on aiding the Philippine-
MILF peace process that is currently being brokered by Malaysia.  If the current 
cease fire holds, and a lasting peace can be maintained, it is plausible that the 
MILF support to the ASG will cease.  A lasting peace agreement will also enable 
the AFP- whose counter-terror capabilities have been increased via U.S. 
assistance- to pursue the ASG in MILF controlled areas that had previously been 
both politically and operationally untenable.    
The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States brought new prominence to 
the Islamic militancy in the Philippines, particularly in Mindanao.  As the U.S. 
began its investigations into the Al Qaeda problem, it became apparent that there 
were links to the MILF in the southern Philippines.  When the U.S. made its 
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reports available to the GRP, it provided a rude wake-up call that the GRP must 
urgently search for a solution to its Muslim problem. 
The strategic importance of a peace accord between the government and 
the MILF cannot be overemphasized.  This is the last major step remaining for 
the GRP to effectively implement a lasting peace in the southern Philippines. In 
1996, Manila forged a peace agreement with the MNLF, which allowed for the 
establishment of autonomy in provinces and cities that voted to be part of the 
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.  Upon the creation of the ARMM, the 
MNLF’s 25 years of armed struggle for independence ended. 
The Malaysian-sponsored peace talks have the potential to do the same 
for the MILF conflict.  The U.S. Institute for Peace, who has been assisting the 
negotiations, contends that there are four reasons to be optimistic about the 
ongoing discussions.  First, the government-MILF cease-fire is holding as 
monitors from member countries of the OIC- Malaysia, Brunei, and Libya- are 
present in the southern Philippines helping to implement the provisions of the 
ceasefire agreement.111  Second, the talks are led by a third-party facilitator, 
Malaysia (playing a supporting role in facilitation is the United States Institute of 
Peace).   Third, the organization of the talks has vastly improved since 1997 as 
the GRP and MILF have agreed to discuss their broad interests instead of 
becoming mired into discussions on mutually agreeable political structures.  
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in their search for armed rebel groups linked to JI and the ASG. Currently, both the AFP and the 
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Fourth, civil society and international aid organizations have been allowed to 
become active participants in the peace process.112  
As detailed in Chapter III, it is likely that some key MILF commanders will 
not support any peace agreement between the MILF leadership and the 
Philippine government that does not include outright independence for the 
Muslim areas of the southern Philippines.  If this were the case, the MILF 
hardliners may transfer their allegiance to JI and the ASG.  This shift would 
certainly lead to an increase in terrorist attacks.113  This may be unavoidable, but 
a successful peace agreement will deny the ASG of something it has been able 
to safely rely on- sanctuary in MILF camps.  A successful peace agreement will 
allow AFP forces, and their U.S. counterparts, to have unrestricted access to 
areas where the ASG and other terrorist groups had previously been operating 
freely without threat of AFP attacks.  The AFP has already proven that it can 
conduct decisive military operations against the ASG, as demonstrated during its 
ongoing Op Plan Ultimatum in the Sulu Archipelago in 2006-2007. 
B. U.S. ASSISTANCE IN IMPROVING SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 
IN THE SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES 
Second, the United States must continue to support the Philippine 
government in the implementation of programs and infrastructure which will 
improve the socio-economic conditions of Muslims in the Southern Philippines.  
This will discourage local support for the ASG.  States compete with insurgent 
groups and terrorists for the support and will of the people.  To be deemed 
legitimate, states must be able to provide basic services as protection and 
welfare to their people.  If not, terrorist groups will be able to exert their will.  The 
Philippine government must continue to invest in infrastructure in the South as it 
is one of the poorest regions in the country, with approximately 65% of the  
 
                                            
112 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as the “Bantay Cease-Fire” (Cease-Fire 
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population below the poverty line.  This part of the country has the lowest access 
to safe drinking water, the least access to electricity, toilet and health facilities of 
any other region.114  
Radical Islamists in the Southern Philippines have been able to capitalize 
on the existence of a constituency that has been neglected.  With no adequate 
government sponsored educational system in place, the radicals have been able 
to promote ideas which are vehemently anti-Western, producing new radicalized 
intellectuals and willing young conscripts for insurgent groups to draw from.  The 
United States should urge other Western countries to come to the aid of the 
Philippines and provide unbiased textbooks and other materials that teach global 
history through peaceful competition and integration.  Through investment in a 
public education system these materials could be disseminated, thereby 
providing an alternative explanation for the misinformation provided by the radical 
Islamists. 
Additionally, annual United States and Philippine bilateral exercises 
should be allowed to continue.  Since 2001 all U.S.-RP bilateral exercises have 
been designed to provide a stabilizing effect to the region, specifically in the 
southern Philippines- most notably Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago (for a 
comprehensive list of exercises see Appendix II).115  Due to this stability, both 
governmental and non-governmental organizations have been able to resume 
aid to this embattled region.   For example, the U.S. was able to deploy the 
USNS Mercy, a U.S. hospital ship, to the Autonomous Region in Muslim 
Mindanao (ARMM) in 2006.  The Mercy was deployed to provide free medical aid 
to thousands of Filipinos on the islands of Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Basilan, 
Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur.116 
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Through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the U.S. 
has also been able to institute various projects that promote the ideal that 
economic opportunities will in turn strengthen peace in Mindanao.   Assisting the 
Philippine government in promoting peace, USAID has helped 28,000 former 
combatants switch from guerilla fighting to farming seaweed, hybrid corn, rice or 
higher value crops.  USAID has also helped 115 banks and rural cooperatives 
provide loans and other services which enhance small business ownership.117   
The United States has remained committed to improving the overall 
welfare of the Southern Philippines by promoting health and education reform.  
USAID works with local governments to bolster their ability to deliver better 
health care, particularly in conflict areas or those with few services.  Once 
considered one of the best in all of Asia, the Philippine education system has 
deteriorated significantly in recent years.  USAID seeks to increased access to 
quality education and livelihood skills in areas most affected by conflict and 
poverty.  The focus is on improving the teaching of math, science, English and 
other subjects in Mindanao's public schools.118  Additionally, through investment 
in the Philippine public education system, USAID is attempting to provide an 
alternative explanation for the misinformation provided by radical Islamists in the 
region. 
In April 2006, the U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines, Kristie A. Kenney, 
visited Zamboanga City, where she unveiled U.S.-funded development projects 
and pledged more aid, particularly in former conflict areas.  She signed 
documents for the construction of two bridges in the villages of Sinunuc and 
Taguiti.119   During her trip she also stated that USAID would provide even more 
grants for Mindanao ($30 million USD) once a permanent peace agreement is 
signed between the GRP and the MILF.   
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C. U.S. ASSISTANCE IN RP FIGHT AGAINST SYSTEMIC CORRUPTION 
Third, the United States should continue to use USAID to assist the 
government of the Philippines in tracking down and prosecuting cases of 
systemic governmental and military corruption which have facilitated ASG 
operations.  The Philippines has constantly had a problem of institutionalized 
corruption that will in all likelihood continue.  One blatant example of systemic 
military corruption and collusion with terrorist groups was in early 2002 when the 
ASG (and its hostages) were allowed to escape from a hospital in Isabella, 
Basilan, after being completely surrounded by the AFP.  To date, no one in the 
AFP has been charged with dereliction of duty regarding this operational failure.  
Successful prosecution of identified cases must be made a priority to discourage 
further acts.  
To date the U.S. government, through USAID, has also worked with the 
Philippine government to curb rampant corruption, by attempting to make it a 
high risk, low reward activity.  The two governments have instituted programs 
that target the areas where corruption has been most damaging: taxes, customs 
administration, government procurement and the judiciary.  One notable example 
came in 2002 when USAID helped the Philippine government strengthen its 2001 
Anti-Money Laundering Act.120  USAID has also helped the Philippine 
government strengthen its economic systems and infrastructure by improving 
inter-island shipping and port facilities.121  
D. CONCLUSION 
The Republic of the Philippines has been battling insurgent groups of 
differing ideologies for over 4 decades.  In the past 10 years it has been making 
some progress, as it signed a peace agreement with the MNLF and has been 
able to begin negotiations with the MILF.  Currently, the Malaysian sponsored 
peace talks with the MILF appears to be the best hope for a successful 
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conclusion.  The U.S. must continue to assist the GRP in this endeavor as it will 
ultimately have a stabilizing effect on the region. 
This is crucial for both the GRP and the MILF for several reasons: first, If 
the peace process fails to proceed not only will the conflict endure but also the 
MILF will become more radical.  Second, this will pose a threat to regional 
security and make it even more difficult for the GRP to address the problems of 
the south.  Third, the MILF’s credibility with its rank and file will be undermined, 
especially with the new generation's members who are already impatient with the 
MILF's failure to bring its promise to reality.   
On the other hand, if the peace process is successfully implemented, the 
MILF must be poised to confront potential factions in the organization and 
effectively police their territory.  As history has shown, the ASG, dedicated to the 
use of terror tactics, can not be negotiated with.  Its members must be hunted 
down and eradicated.  As mentioned, if the peace agreement is signed, the AFP 
will have unimpeded access to areas the ASG has been able to utilize for 
sanctuary. Additionally, the GRP must also not let itself be blindly fixed solely on 
military operations nor should it be complacent and believe that results will 
happen overnight.  A dedicated effort must be made by the Philippine 
government, bolstered by U.S. assistance, to solve the socio-economic and 
political disparities faced by the Muslims in the Southern Philippines.  If not, the 











































APPENDIX I: CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR ASG EVENTS122            
1991   ASG militants attacked a military checkpoint in  Sumagadang.  
    
1992   ASG member Edwin Angeles abducted a businesswoman in  
  Davao and hid her at a residence in Basilan.  She was released  
  after paying ransom.  
    
1993   In April, a bus company owner and his five-year-old grandson  
  were kidnapped by the ASG. The grandfather was released but the  
  child was held. The ASG demanded that Catholic symbols be  
  removed from all Muslim communities and that a ban be imposed  
  on all foreign fishing vessels in the Sulu and Basilan seas.  
    
  In November, Abu Sayyaf kidnapped an American from his home  
  on Pangutaran island and held him for just over three weeks; the  
  government denied paying a ransom but admitted to offering food  
  and other supplies.  
    
1994   In January, Ramzi Ahmed Yousef visited the Philippines and  
  assisted Abu Sayyaf in a bomb attack on a Philippines Airlines flight 
  to Tokyo in December, during which one person was killed.  
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1994   Abu Sayyaf was responsible for a bomb attack on a church in  
  Davao City, during a Christmas service, in which six people were  
  killed and 130 were wounded.  
    
1995   In April, the group joined forces with guerrillas from the MILF and  
  the Islamic Command Council to attack the town of Ipil, Mindanao.  
  During the attack 54 people were killed and a dozen Christian  
  villagers taken hostage, then subsequently massacred.  
    
1996   In December, there were heavy clashes between Abu Sayyaf and  
  the AFP in Carmen, North Cotabato, and Zamboanga de Norte.  
    
1997   In February, the group was accused of complicity in the murder of a 
  Roman Catholic bishop and a bystander in Jolo.  
    
  Armed clashes between Abu Sayyaf and the security forces were  
  reported on the island of Basilan.  
    
1998   In August, following the U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and  
  Tanzania, Abu Sayyaf warned that it would increase its campaign  
  of violence, potentially to include foreigners as targets.  
    
2000   The ASG seized and held 21 people as hostages from the   
  Malaysian coastal resort of Sipadan. Most were foreign tourists and 
  the group demanded the release of several prisoners in the U.S.  
  including Ramzi Yousef. Libya mediated an end to the crisis and  
  several million dollars was paid to the group from European private  
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2000  individuals. In a later incident the same ASG cell seized three  
  Malaysians from a Borneo resort and took them to Sulu.  
    
  In August the ASG kidnapped and accused a U.S. citizen who met  
  with a senior guerrilla leader, Jeffrey Schilling, of being a member  
  of the CIA and demanded USD2 million for his release.  
    
2001   In April, Jeffery Schilling was rescued.  
    
  In May the ASG kidnapped 17 tourists, including three Americans  
  and three resort workers from the Dos Palmas beach resort on  
  Palawan island, Philippines. When the government attempted to  
  pursue the kidnappers, the ASG seized 200 more hostages from a  
  hospital and church in Lamitan.  
    
2002  In January, 1,200 U.S. troops were sent to the Philippines to 
support government action against Islamic militants.  
    
  A group of U.S.-trained Philippine troops stormed an Abu Sayyaf  
  jungle camp in June in an effort to rescue two Americans and a  
  Filipino nurse being held hostage. During the rescue attempt, the  
  nurse and one of the Americans were killed but the third hostage -  
  U.S. missionary Gracia Burnham - escaped with only minor injuries.  
    
  In June, Aldam Tilao, better known as Abu Sabaya, was killed in a  
  clash at sea off the northern coast of the Zamboanga peninsula.  
    
58 
2002  In August, six hostages were taken captive by ASG gunmen. Soon  
  afterwards, two of the hostages were executed by beheading.  
    
  In November, Abdul Mukhim Edris, the ASG's chief explosives  
  expert, was captured.  
    
  Under the pressure of government forces, a number of ASG   
  members were reported to have fled the Philippines by means of  
  fast watercraft in December. These persons were thought to have  
  found refuge in Malaysia. Soldiers in the region were put on alert to  
  be on the lookout for displaced ASG members.  
    
2003   In January, Merang Abante, reportedly a member of the ASG  
  leadership, was captured by the Philippine security forces in the  
  southern Philippines. Subsequently, Maid Sampang, an ASG  
  member wanted for the killing of eight fishermen, was also   
  captured.  
    
  In January, an additional 200 U.S. soldiers were sent to support the 
  operation of government forces against terrorist organizations.  
    
  In February, Mujib Susukan, effectively the ASG's third-ranking  
  Sulu commander, was mortally wounded in a firefight in Patikul,  
  Jolo.  
    
  In June, ASG logistics officer Samir Hakim was arrested in Manila  
  by a joint PNP-military intelligence team.  
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2003  In July, explosives expert Edris escaped from his cell at PNP  
  Headquarters at Camp Crame, Manila, along with one of Jemaah 
  Islamiyya's leading bombers, Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, and another 
  ASG convict, Omar Opik Lasal. Edris was recaptured in Lanao del  
  Norte province in Mindanao on 7 August but shot dead several  
  hours later while reportedly attempting to wrest a rifle from his army 
  captors.  
    
  In December, Galib Andang, aka Kumander Robot, was captured.  
    
2004   In February the ASG sank Superferry 14 in Manila Bay, killing more 
  than 100 people on board, as part of an extortion campaign.  
    
  In March, apparent six ASG members were killed in a clash with the 
  AFP in Sulu.  
    
  The ASG kidnapped three people, one Indonesian and two   
  Malaysians, off the coast of Lingkian island in Malaysian waters.  
  The operations involved boarding a small Malaysian vessel and  
  abducting the crew.  
    
  In May, two reported ASG members were apparently caught with  
  an improvised explosive device involving an adapted 60 mm mortar 
  round and a mobile telephone detonator. PNP reports claimed that  
  their intention was to bomb the Commission on Elections head  
  office in Manila prior to the presidential elections.  
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2004   In May and June, three minor explosions were detonated in Jolo,  
  with the third killing an army bomb squad member and two other  
  security force personnel. The ASG was blamed.  
 
   In August, 17 ASG members were sentenced to death for   
  kidnapping nurses in Lamitan, Basilan in 2001 following the Dos  
  Palmas kidnapping. The sentence was the first mass conviction of  
  ASG militants.  
   
  In November, the AFP launched an air strike using Huey   
  helicopters, and OV-10 aircraft on a supposed ASG/Jemaah   
  Islamiyya meeting in Mindanao. The AFP claimed 10 ASG/JI  
  militants were killed, but MILF claimed it was their meeting, and that 
  only one MILF member was wounded.  
    
  On 12 December, an explosion in a market in General Santos City  
  (Mindanao) killed 15 people. The ASG were named as possible  
  perpetrators.  
    
2005   On 9 February, Philippine military sources claimed at least 40  
  rebels had died in heavy fighting between government troops and  
  suspected ASG militants on the Philippine island of Jolo. The  
  attacks involved the use of army howitzers and aircraft.  
    
  On 14 February, the ASG claimed credit for three near-  
  simultaneous bomb blasts in Makati City, Davao City, and General  
  Santos City. 11 people were killed and approximately 140 injured.  
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2005   On 15 March, an attempted jailbreak led to the deaths of 22 alleged 
  ASG members, including three mid-ranking cadres, when security  
  forces stormed the prison. The ASG issued a statement soon after  
  vowing revenge for the deaths. Philippine police also seized ten  
  bags of ammonium nitrate, apparently intended to bomb shopping  
  malls and Christian churches over the Easter period.  
    
  On 10 August, two bombs exploded in the southern Philippine city  
  of Zamboanga, wounding eight people. A military spokesman  
  blamed ASG militants for the attack.  
 
  On 16 November 2005, ASG militants fired shells at Philippine  
  troops while fleeing hideouts on the island of Jolo. 29 people,  
  including four soldiers, were killed in three preceding days of  
  fighting between the AFP and ASG rebels. A mosque and several  
  houses were also destroyed in the attack. 
 
2006  In August 2006, the Philippine government ordered the AFP to  
  begin an intense campaign (labeled Op Plan Ultimatum) against the 
  Abu Sayyaf in the Sulu archipelago.   
 
  On Sep 4, 2006, Khaddafy Janjalani was killed during a firefight  
  with the AFP in Pakitul, Jolo.   
 
2007  Janjalani’s second-in-command, Abu Solaiman, was killed on  























APPENDIX II: U.S.-RP EXERCISE DIRECTORY123 
BAKER PISTON 
A JIATF West-coordinated ground operations law enforcement training in 
the Philippines. The objective of the Baker exercises (“Piston” designates 
Philippines) is to improve the effectiveness of Philippine counter-drug agencies 
by training those agencies in such topics as: Cordon and search techniques, 
special reconnaissance, medical training, advanced marksmanship, small unit 
tactics in urban terrain, instructor training, mission planning, training 
management, trail interdiction, and movement techniques.  
BALANCE PISTON 
Small unit tactics, unconventional warfare, special recon/direct action, 
internal defense operation, CMO, low level air/land tactics, airborne operations, 
live fire exercise, marksmanship, day/night air operations and information 
operations.  
BALIKATAN 
Annual JCS directed multi-lateral training exercise with the RP-U.S. 
Mutual Defense Treaty as the basis.  This year’s exercise will focus on 
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). Training events include Command Post 
Exercise (CPX), Cross-Training Exercise (CTX), Live Fire Exercise (LFX), 
Humanitarian Civic Action (HCA), and Civil Military Operations (CMO). Main 
objective of “Balikatan” (Shouldering the Load Together) is to enhance 
interoperability of AFP and U.S. forces at the operational and tactical level.  
CARAT 
Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training.  A USN 7th Fleet annual 
exercise with the Philippine Navy.  Objective of the exercise is to develop 
interoperability between the two navies. Training events include amphibious 
landings, humanitarian civic action (HCA), diving and salvage operations.  
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Cobra Gold 
This is a U.S.-Thai exercise similar to that of the Philippine Balikatan 
exercise but involves a division-size troop participation, and is also considered as 
multi-lateral exercise with the participation of other countries like Singapore, 
Mongolia and Philippines. 
FLASH PISTON  
A JCET Exercise between U.S. Navy and Phil Navy Seals on small unit 
tactics and marksmanship.  Training includes maritime close quarter combat and 
Jungle Environmental Survival Training (JEST). 
FUSION PISTON 
Lead by the AFP and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).  
Training will cover various aspects of maritime law enforcement in support of 
counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism operations (e.g., first aid, boat 
maintenance, communications, boat handling, evidence preservation, patrolling, 
insert/extract methods, reconnaissance, mission planning, and a field training 
exercise.  Members from the DEA, U.S. Navy SEALS and JIATIF-W will conduct 
training for members of the AFP, PNP, Philippine Coast Guard, and the Anti-
Illegal Drugs SPECOPS Task Force. 
HANDA 
 This is a USCINCPAC annual co-hosted game simulation to prepare key 
RP and U.S. national government agencies, armed forces headquarters, and 
component force staffs to better coordinate interagency operations.  Participants 
from the RP include: DND, DFA, NEDA, NICA DILG, AFP, and various RP 
agencies. 
MARSEAEX - MARITIME SEA EXERCISE   
This is a multi-lateral exercise between the USN, the Republic of the 
Philippines Navy (PN), and the Royal Thai Navy (RTN).  Purpose is to train 
participants on maritime surveillance procedures and to enhance multi-national 
interoperability in the conduct of maritime surveillance. 
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MARSURVEX - MARITIME SURVEILLANCE EXERCISE 
7th Fleet sponsored USN-PN exercise involving U.S. Navy P3 Orion with 
Philippine Navy surface assets on maritime surveillance and search and rescue 
operations.   
MTWS   
Marine Tactical Warfare Simulation. MTWS is a USMC initiative involving 
computer driven simulated Command Post Exercise (CPX), which revolves 
around a Combined Amphibious Task Force (CATF).  It is designed to train the 
commanders and staff of a Marine Regiment consisting of two or more Battalion 
Landing Teams (BLT). 
PALAH   
Pangdagat Lupat and Himpapawid.  This is a bilateral COMSEVENTH 
FLT Naval Special Warfare exercise with elements of the AFP.  Commander’s 
intent is to maintain and improve combat readiness and interoperability between 
U.S. Forces and the AFP.  PALAH provides U.S. and RP SEALs an exceptional 
training environment, with an opportunity to improve interoperability between 
PN/USN in areas of maritime special operations, military operations in urban 
terrain, and close quarters combat operations.  Training to be conducted, but not 
limited to:  Live Fire, marksmanship, Jungle survival (JEST), OTB environment, 
Patrolling, Military operations in urban terrain, close quarters combat, and 
mission planning. 
PHIBLEX/MEUEX 
Amphibious Landing Exercise/Marine Expeditionary Unit Exercise. The 
MEUEX is an AFP-U.S. Armed Forces Bi-lateral exercise to be conducted in the 
Republic of the Philippines (RP).  The scope of the exercise includes the 
Combined Task Force Staff Exercise and Command Post Exercise (CTF 
STAFFEX/CPX) Event, Combined Forces Cross Training and Field Training 




Philippine Interoperability Exercise. U.S. & RP Marines Interoperability 
training focused on infantry and reconnaissance operations. Marksmanship, 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), Intelligence planning, and Airborne 
Operations. 
RIMPAC 
Rim of the Pacific.  Seven Pacific Rim nations, along with the United 
Kingdom and France, participate in Rim of the Pacific, a major maritime exercise 
conducted in the waters off Hawaii.  RIMPAC brings together maritime forces 
from Australia, Canada, Chile, Peru, France, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the 
United Kingdom and the United States. 
SAGIP 
This is a trilateral seminar/workshop type of exercise on disaster, search 
and rescue operations with the participation of the U.S., Australia and RP. 
SEACAT 
Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism.  Multilateral exercise 
which allows Southeast Asian nations to join together in a spirit of cooperation 
against worldwide terrorist threat.  Exercises will give the Armed Forces the 
unique opportunity to exchange ideas and prepare the way for future coordinated 
exercises relevant to regional concerns.  SEACAT supported opportunities for 
the USN and PN to conduct coordinated surveillance and tracking operations 
against maritime vessels of interest. 
TALON VISION 
A bilateral Ground-Air Integrated Training (GAIT) exercise with elements 
of the AFP.  CMDR’s Intent (III MEF) - To maintain and improve combat 
readiness and interoperability between U.S. Forces and the AFP.  Talon vision 
provides Marines and sailors an exceptional training environment with the 
endstate of improving interoperability between PN/USN/PHILMAR/USMC in 
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areas of amphibious warfare planning, naval surface warfare, helicopter 
operations aboard ship and amphibious operations.   
Teak Piston 
An Air Force-to-Air Force exercise focusing on low level flight navigation, 
infiltration and exfiltration operations, and air drops. It also includes the 
maintenance of C- 130 aircraft. 
VECTOR BALANCE PISTON 
A SOCPAC sponsored JCET Exercise specializing in Close Quarter Battle 
and marksmanship skills. This exercise is conducted by the U.S. Army’s 1st 
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